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The Eternal Present: Slow Knowledge
and the Renewal of Time
Douglas E. Christie
Loyola Marymount University

A woman is seated in a chair at the center of a large, light-filled atrium. Across from
her sits an adolescent girl, Asian or Asian-American, maybe thirteen years old. They
are both perfectly still. They look intently at each other. That is all. Minute after
minute passes. Neither of them moves. I look more closely. Utter stillness. Not quite
repose, for there is a sense of intentionality to their engagement with each other, but
deep stillness and calm. I look around the room and see a hundred or so persons also
taking in the scene. Everyone is silent, though there are occasional sounds—shoes
shuffling on the floor, a cough, a sigh. It takes me a few minutes to understand what
is going on, what I am seeing. I feel my own anxiety to place myself somehow in this
scene, to find the appropriate categories for grasping what is unfolding before me. I
ask a person nearby; he tells me: it’s Marina Abramovic. She is performing “The Artist Is Present,” part of a retrospective of her work at the Museum of Modern Art in
New York City.1 “Oh,” I say, “thanks.” It’s performance art. Got it. But knowing this
only helps a little. What are they doing? What is going on here? What is my part, if
any, in what is happening? My mind, as usual, is racing ahead trying to figure it out.
Which in this moment I cannot do. So, I pause (inwardly), take a step back and try to
reorient myself. I take a breath, then another. I look again at the two figures.
Their stillness is uncanny. This is part of what is making me anxious, I think. They
are absorbed completely in the simple act of gazing at each other. I smile, thinking
at first of the “stare-downs” I used to have with my brother when we were kids. Who
would flinch (and fall into uncontrollable laughter) first? It was a game of chicken.
With the eyes. Usually it was of short duration, and someone had to lose. This is different. The quality of attention, in particular, feels utterly different. These two are
not trying to knock each other off their chairs. No one is trying to “win” at anything.
They are, it seems, simply giving themselves to the work of beholding and being
beheld. Extraordinary. I am not sitting in the chair. But I feel a jolt run through my
body as I begin to feel the depth and power of this moment. The sense of nakedness, of
naked abandon, of vulnerability. What else? Tenderness. Yes, I sense a certain tenderness passing between these two figures. And not just between them. Also touching
those of us gathered in the room watching them. How is that possible? We are all
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strangers to one another after all. And yet within this space, for these few moments
there is a remarkable and palpable sense of intimacy.
I am not sure at how long I stand there. But after a while, I feel the need to move,
to get some relief from the intensity of this exchange. I leave the room where the artist and her companion are sitting and walk into a nearby gallery. (Later I learn that
anyone visiting the museum can occupy the chair opposite the artist and that over
the course of the exhibit many, many people do just that.) I am not ready to look at
anything else, not yet. I have to gather myself a little first.
Eventually, I do begin to take in some of the other art in the museum. But my
mind keeps returning to that room and to those two seated figures. During the next
couple of hours, I return to the atrium several more times. Each time I do, I am struck
by how still these two figures are, how alive. Also how still and alive I feel entering
into that space. Those of us beholding the scene are respectful and quiet but also
animated, exchanging brief whispers, glances, smiles. We are captivated, enthralled.
Suddenly the girl sitting opposite the artist gets up, makes a gentle bow, and
leaves the center of the space. She goes to sit with her father, who has been standing
there watching her. They exchange a hug, then some quiet words. She seems thrilled.
Then another person moves into the center of the space and sits down in the chair
across from the artist and the process begins again.
A few minutes later, my curiosity gets the better of me and I approach the girl to
ask whether I may speak with her for a moment. “Sure,” she says. “How long were
you sitting there?” I ask. “Three hours,” she says. “I was only going to sit there for ten
minutes or so, but something happened. I did not want to leave.”
I think about this experience for a long time afterward. I am still thinking about
it. Especially the long, slow unfolding of attention and awareness that was at the center of it—shared by the two principals to be sure, but also in some mysterious way by
those of us who entered the space and beheld the two of them beholding each other.
And the strange sense—whether real or imagined—of time being suspended, of feeling drawn into a space where whatever was going to happen would happen gradually,
imperceptibly, unconstrained by the usual boundaries of chronology. Or where nothing at all would happen and time and purpose would lose their usual meanings and
perhaps their unquestioned value.
*

*

*

The term “slow knowledge” has emerged in contemporary discourse as part of a larger
discussion about how and how quickly we acquire knowledge. And to what end.
Also about the value we place on speed and efficiency in acquiring knowledge, and
about how well we are able to absorb the rapidly increasing volume of information
made available to us through improvements in technology. David Orr’s trenchant
essay on this subject, which first appeared in the journal Conservation Biology in 2002
and was later reprinted in his 2004 book, The Nature of Design: Ecology, Culture and
Human Intention, makes a strong argument for the need to reassess our often uncritical attitudes toward “fast” knowledge and to open ourselves (again) to slower modes
of knowledge. Orr pits these two ways of knowing sharply against each other, partly
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for the sake of rhetorical clarity, but also in order to raise questions about the broad
assumption—so much in evidence in our digital age—that we can no longer afford
to move or think slowly, that to do so is to risk falling behind. Many assume that our
only real choice is to find ways of moving and thinking more quickly and efficiently,
and that we must learn to process and hold more, not less, information.2
Framing the argument this way may feel too simple. It is too simple. Those like
Orr who advocate for the value of retrieving slower modes of knowing and being
are not generally arguing against speed or efficiency themselves. There is no question about the value of speed and efficiency when it comes to what we expect and
hope for from emergency disaster-relief services, for example; nor do we want medical
breakthroughs or tax refunds to arrive more slowly. Similarly, there is no denying the
significance of the kind of knowledge that comes to us quickly and intuitively, such
as the flashes of insight or understanding so well known to scientists, artists, and
mystics. No, it is not speed itself that is the problem. It is the cult of speed and its
evil cousin the cult of utility: the unquestioned assumption that both speed and utility are to be valued above all else, and that anything that hinders us from realizing
maximum speed and utility cannot and should not be given any serious consideration.
These are not new ideas.3 But they have become a particularly prominent feature of
contemporary life. And resisting them or articulating an alternative vision of existence is not easy. Still, one sees increasing signs of wide-ranging and diverse forms of
resistance gathering around the notion that we have underestimated and undervalued slowness. To realize the kind of cultural, political, and spiritual renewal we so
desperately need will require us to reexamine and perhaps reimagine certain older,
slower modes of knowing. Hence, the growing attention being given not only to
slow knowledge, but also to slow food, slow medicine, slow travel, slow living.4 What
these diverse movements and initiatives hold in common is a desire to rethink our
relationship to time. In particular, to consider when and how our habitual attention to
the movement (and urgency) of chronological time should give way to an awareness
of time that is less constraining, more spacious, free, and open. And to consider the
possibility that this slower, more spacious relationship with time might still be able
to contribute something significant to our understanding of who we are in the world.
If this sounds like an argument for the continued value of contemplative practice and distinctively contemplative approaches of knowledge, it is. Although the
understanding of contemplative practice and knowledge itself will likely need to be
stretched to include expressions and forms not always included in more traditional
understandings of this idea: for example, in the case of that performance of contemplative practice at the Museum of Modern Art. One of the striking features of that
event was its seemingly cavalier disregard of time. It is true that during this particular exhibition the museum maintained its usual opening and closing hours; time
retained certain recognizable and socially sanctioned boundaries. But not completely.
The artist herself often arrived early and remained in place long after the museum
closed. And within the space of the performance, time was unrestrained, unrestricted,
boundless. There was no effort made to “keep things moving,” or to determine how
long those who chose to sit opposite the artist could remain there. Time unfolded
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freely and fluidly. Those who entered that space were invited to lose themselves in
that expansive space. To be, as the artist herself was, present.
This will perhaps remind some of the kind of attitude one is expected to cultivate
when entering the sacred space of a church, temple, or mosque, or it may call to mind
the stillness and openness that characterizes certain kinds of meditation practices.
These analogies are instructive, for in such spaces and amid such practices, time indeed
takes on a different character. If time itself does not “slow down” in any objective sense,
our experience of time changes. We enter into a different kind of relationship to it. The
unrelenting force of chronos gradually gives way to the more capacious sense of kairos.
One might well ask in response to such an account: So what? What difference does
it make to open oneself to such a capacious relationship with time? To a way of living
that may well seem simply to be a form of time wasting?
*

*

*

I want to consider these questions, especially as they arise in traditions of contemplative practice (whether broadly or narrowly construed). In particular, I want to consider
whether such practiced, intentional squandering of time—and the attitude toward
knowledge implied by it—can be defended, made sense of, perhaps even understood
as contributing to a larger, more encompassing renewal of self and culture.
It is useful here to recall that still strange experiment of Henry David Thoreau’s at
Walden Pond. In the “Sounds” chapter of Walden, Thoreau describes both his practice
and his orientation during his first summer there.
I did not read books the first summer; I hoed beans. Nay, I often did better
than this. There were times when I could not afford to sacrifice the bloom of
the present moment to any work, whether of the head or the hands. I love a
broad margin to my life. Sometimes, in a summer morning, having taken my
accustomed bath, I sat in my sunny doorway from sunrise till noon, rapt in a
revery, amidst the pines and hickories and sumachs, in undisturbed solitude
and stillness, while the birds sang around or flitted noiseless through the house,
until by the sun falling in at my west window, or the noise of some traveller’s
wagon on the distant highway, I was reminded of the lapse of time.5
This deceptively simple account reveals more than it seems to do at first glance, suggesting the kind of practice Thoreau took to be central to his experiment in living at
Walden Pond. Not only does this habitually wide-ranging reader refrain from reading
for the sake of tending his garden; at times he eschews all work (whether of the head
or the hands) for the sake of what he refers to as the “bloom of the present moment.”
He allows himself to become lost in that moment, until to his surprise he realizes the
entire day has passed.
It is tempting to dismiss Thoreau’s account as the reflections of a romantic dreamer
or idler. But there is something utterly serious in his account of his days at Walden,
the meaning of which becomes clear when read in the context of his long opening
chapter, “Economy.” There, with sustained attention to the most practical dimensions
of what is required for everyday living, the significance of a life committed to idle-
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ness emerges: his cultivation of a more spacious sense of time, his willingness to open
himself to the world without calculation (either economic or chronological) reveals an
ethical commitment to take up less room, to leave more for others, to reconfigure the
very meaning of community. It recasts the very meaning of purpose, and argues for
the need to let the apparently aimless awareness of oneself as alive in the world gather
and deepen—not simply as a personal choice, but as necessary to the renewal of social
and political life. Here and elsewhere in Walden, one encounters an orientation to living that expresses a fierce critique of the unquestioned primacy of chronological time
and an effort to retrieve a way of living that is more spacious and free.6
Ancient contemplative traditions of Christianity also struggled with these questions. A story from the Apophthegmata Patrum relates that “Abba Sisoes [one day] said
to a brother, ‘How are you getting on?’ and he replied: ‘I am wasting my time, father.’
The old man said, ‘If I happen to waste a day, I am grateful for it.’” 7 It is not easy to
discern the particular anxiety that underlay this brother’s response to Abba Sisoes, or
to be certain of the meaning of the elder’s expression of gratitude for his own occasional experiences of simple, profligate living. But seen in the context of the monks’
consistent expression of hope that they might learn to live with amerimnia or “freedom from care,” Sisoes’s response illuminates the value early monastic communities
attributed to relinquishing all plans, all projects, all designs for one’s life, all concerns
regarding progress—especially progress in the spiritual life—for the sake of an inner
disposition of freedom and openness that allows one’s relationship to time to take on
a completely new meaning.
This commitment to a more spacious relationship to time also helps to account for
the monks’ often surprising attitudes toward the manner and means and time required
to acquire knowledge. A story about Abba Pambo points to the extraordinary patience
some of the monks displayed in incorporating the teaching of their elders. One day,
in response to a request from an elder for a word, Pambo was given these words from
Psalm 38—”I said I will take heed to thy way, that I offend not with my tongue”—
and departed without staying to hear the elder recite the second half of the verse. He
said to himself, “this one will suffice, if I can practically acquire it.” More than six
months passed before he returned to consult with the elder again. When he did so,
the old man reproved Pambo for staying away so long. But Pambo replied that the
reason for his long absence was that he had been fully occupied during the past months
with the text he had been given. Even now, he said, “he had not yet learnt to practice
the verse of the Psalm.” Many years later, Pambo was asked by one of his companions
whether he had finally mastered the text. He responded: “I have scarcely succeeded
in accomplishing it during nineteen years.”8 Stories like this are common in early
Christian monastic literature. Whether or not we judge the time frame described to
be entirely credible, the point of the story is clear: certain kinds of knowledge cannot
be acquired quickly or efficiently. It takes time. A long time. Such knowledge needs
to be incorporated slowly and carefully into the lived experience of the contemplative
until the very framework of thought and awareness has been transformed: until the
consciousness of oneself in relation to God and others has become suffused with a sense
of eternity, or what the tradition has often referred to simply as the reign of heaven.9
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There is a paradox or tension here relating to the whole question of how one
should understand both time and work within contemplative practice. Throughout
the Christian contemplative tradition one finds a positive valuation of the need for
patient attention to time’s slow unfolding, on the importance of the gradual deepening of awareness—especially awareness of the divine—that can only be acquired
through long experience. But there is also a wide acknowledgment that such awareness is itself a gift and can be made present in its entirety in a flash. The question of the relative value of work is similarly ambiguous. There is frequent allusion
in the Christian contemplative tradition to the distinction between “acquired” and
“infused” contemplation, and to the dialectical tension between “work” and “rest.”
These distinctions touch on fundamental questions relating to the very character of
contemplative experience. How much depends on the contemplative’s own effort?
How much is pure gift and must be received as such in a place of rest or receptivity?
How much time does it take to open up one’s awareness to the divine presence? Does
time itself (or at least our conventional understanding of time) sometimes disappear
as a category of experience? Does slowness in relation to contemplative practice refer
primarily to process (how one seeks knowledge) or to experience (the sense of timelessness that opens up within contemplative practice)?
Let me offer an example of how these questions are treated in the work of the
fourteenth century Flemish mystic John Ruusbroec. In The Spiritual Espousals, written
sometime in the mid-1330s, Ruusbroec describes the “eternal coming of the bridegroom” Christ as “a new birth and a new illumination which knows no interruption”
and that is “ceaselessly renewed in the hidden depths of the spirit. . . . The coming of
the Bridegroom,” Ruusbroec claims, “is so fast that he has always come and is always
abiding . . . because his coming occurs beyond time in an eternal now, which is ever
received with new pleasure and new joy.”10 This dense account of mystical experience
offers a fascinating insight into how such experience alters (or can alter) one’s very
sense of time. There is in this account no sense of past or future. There is only an
“eternal now.” Still, there is also, paradoxically, a “coming” which suggests duration
or movement through time. But it is an “eternal coming” that “knows no interruption” and which is “ceaselessly renewed” within the one who receives it. There is only
now. That is, eternity.
This sense of entering a dimension of experience that is for all intents and purposes timeless finds echoes throughout the Christian contemplative tradition; here
one often finds a similar tension between the apparent expansiveness of time and its
intense compression. Nor should one ignore the ordinary practices that gave rise to
such expansive/compressed awareness: especially the daily practice of sustained attention to self, community, and God in the context of the liturgy, silence, manual labor,
reading, and service to others. This is the ground and the space, not unlike Thoreau’s
broad margin, that creates the possibility of entering and living within the “bloom
of the present moment.”
The American Trappist monk and writer Thomas Merton offers an eloquent
account of this reality in a talk he gave to the community at Redwoods Monastery in
California shortly before his death in 1968.11 Merton was addressing the community
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on the question of how to live a life of authentic and abiding prayer. In particular, he
found himself drawn toward the question of how we can avoid turning prayer into
simply another activity governed by the tyranny of chronological time.
We were indoctrinated so much into means and ends that we don’t realize that
there is a different dimension in the life of prayer. In technology you have this
horizontal progress, where you must start at one point and move to another
and then to another. But that is not the way to build a life of prayer. In prayer,
we discover what we already have. You start where you are and you deepen
what you already have and you realize you are already there. We already have
everything, but we don’t know it and we don’t experience it. Everything has
been given to us in Christ. All we need is to experience what we already possess.
Here, arising from the heart of the Christian monastic tradition, we encounter a simple, clear, evocative account of what prayer is or should be: the unfolding of a palpable
sense of divine presence, born of the realization of what we already know, of what
already lives within us. This account is consistent with the testimony of monks and
mystics from the earliest period of Christianity until now and reflects the simple clarity that can arise within our consciousness when we relinquish the categories of means
and ends, when we allow ourselves to live into the eternal present.
Still, Merton knew from his own experience how difficult it could be to let go of
the old mental habits, especially the habit of giving into the relentless claim of time
upon our souls. “If we really want prayer,” he notes, “we’ll have to give it time. We
must slow down to a human tempo and we’ll begin to have time to listen. And as soon
as we listen to what’s going on, things will begin to take shape by themselves. But for
this we have to experience time in a new way.” This is not easy to do. Merton’s own
awareness of this more expansive sense of time came relatively late in his life, after he
moved to the hermitage. It was there, he notes, that he began to become “attentive to
the times of day: when the birds began to sing, and the deer came out of the morning fog, and the sun came up”—rhythms rooted in the cycles of the natural world.
He became aware of how, even in the monastery, there was a widespread “feeling
that we have to keep moving.” When chronos trumps kairos we lose our capacity for a
more spacious, encompassing experience of prayer. Here we come to the fundamental
issue: time becomes a commodity. “For each one of us time is mortgaged. We experience time as unlimited indebtedness. We are sharecroppers of time.” It is sobering
to recall that he uttered these words in 1968, long before the ubiquitous presence
of the always-on Internet or social networking or the twenty-four-hour news cycle.
But the image is, if anything, even more poignant for us: whole hours, days, weeks
already accounted for, already spent, long before we ever have the opportunity to live
into them. Time as endless indebtedness: that rich space closed up, lost to us forever.
Seen from this perspective, the approach to time and prayer and knowledge found
in contemplative traditions begins to seem both utterly radical and necessary. “We
must approach the whole idea of time in a new way,” says Merton. “We are free to live.
And [we] must get free from all imaginary claims. We live in the fullness of time.
Every moment is God’s own good time, his kairos. . . . We have what we seek. We
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don’t have to rush after it. It is there all the time, and if we give it time it will make
itself known to us.”
It is not easy to imagine living this way. There is an inevitable sense of foolishness that comes with letting go so completely of the idea of purpose. Or perhaps it is
something even more disturbing than this: the sense that here in this spaciousness,
we no longer control anything—knowledge, existence, anything. This radical relinquishment of control is critical to the emerging sense of what it will mean to live
more slowly, more openly, more fully. There is an intense vulnerability here that has
always been central to the life of prayer. It is the vulnerability of the gaze, in which
we risk beholding another even as we open ourselves to being beheld. Here time no
longer seems to matter. There is only a mysterious unfolding of timeless presence.
*

*

*

I returned recently to the exhibit by Marina Abromovic. Not in real time (the exhibit
closed in May 2010) but, as happens increasingly in our lives, through the eternal
present of the Web. I was surprised by what I discovered there. Someone had photographed the participants in the exhibit—all those who sat opposite the artist for a
few moments or a few hours, as well as the artist herself. I sat for a long time looking at those faces. Those beautiful faces. After maybe ten minutes, I began to notice
something: many of them had tears streaming down their faces. Sitting in that public
space, gazing into the eyes of the artist, they had suddenly found themselves weeping. It is impossible to know what those tears express. But their presence within the
immense stillness of those days gave me pause. What were we looking for, those of us
who stumbled upon that space and ended up staying for long minutes or hours? What
did we find? Whatever it was, I know that the slow, unfolding of time into which we
all entered was part of it, was the necessary condition for the birth and illumination
that occurred that day. And which, for me anyway, continues to be ceaselessly renewed
even now.
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